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Abstract. In this paper, we propose a Directed threshold multisignature scheme without SDC. This 
signature scheme is applicable when the message is sensitive to the signature receiver; and the signatures are 
generated by the cooperation of a number of people from a given group of senders.  In this scheme, any 
malicious set of signers cannot impersonate any other set of signers to forge the signatures. In case of forgery, 
it is possible to trace the signing set. 
             Key words. Digital signature, Directed signatures, Multi-signatures, Threshold-
signatures, Lagrange interpolation, discrete logarithm problems.  
1. Introduction 
Digital signature is a cryptographic tool to authenticate electronic communications. Digital signature 
scheme allows a user with a public key and a corresponding private key to sign a document in such a way 
that anyone can verify the signature on the document (using her/his public key), but no one can forge the 
signature on any other document. This self-authentication is required for some applications of digital 
signatures such as certification by some authority.  
In most situations, the signer is generally a single person. However, in some cases the message is sent 
by one organization and requires the approval or consent of several people. In these cases, the signature 
generation is done by more than one consenting person. A common example of this policy is a large bank 
transaction, by one organization, which requires the signature of more than one partner. Such a policy 
could be implemented by having a separate digital signature for every required signer, but this solution 
increases the effort to verify the message linearly with the number of signer. To solve this problems, 
Multisignature schemes [10,11,13,17,18] and threshold signature schemes [5,6,7,9,12,20] are used where 
more than one signers share the responsibility of signing messages 
Threshold signatures are closely related to the concept of threshold cryptography, first introduced by 
Desmedt [5, 6, 7]. In 1991, Desmedt and Frankel [6] proposed the first (t, n) threshold digital signature 
scheme based on the RSA system. In (t, n) threshold signature scheme, any subgroup of t or more   
shareholders of the designated group can generate a valid group signature in such a way that the verifier 
can check the validity of the signature without identifying the identities of the signers. In threshold 
schemes, when any t or more shareholders act in collusion, they can impersonate any other set of 
shareholders to forge the signatures. In this case, the malicious set of signers does not have any 
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responsibility for the signatures and it is impossible to trace the signers. Unfortunately, with threshold 
schemes proposed so far, this problem cannot be solved. 
In multisignature schemes, the signers of a multisignature are identified in the beginning and the 
validity of the multisignature has to be verified with the help of identities of the signers. For 
multisignature, it is indeed unnecessary to put a threshold value to restrict the number of signers. 
Consider the situation, where a group of anonymous members would have to generate a multisignature. 
The members of this group use pseudonyms as their identities in the public directory. What concerns the 
verifier most is that at least t members sign a message and they indeed come from that group. 
Nevertheless, the verifier has no way to verify whether a user is in fact a member of that group because of 
the anonymity of the membership. In this case, the multisignature schemes cannot solve this problems, 
however, the threshold signature schemes do. 
On the other hands, there are so many situations, when the signed message is sensitive to the 
signature receiver. Signatures on medical records, tax information and most personal/business 
transactions are such situations. Signatures used in such situations are called directed signatures [1, 2, 3, 
14, 15, 19, 23, 24]. In directed signature scheme, the signature receiver has full control over the signature 
verification process and can prove the validity of the signature to any third party, whenever necessary. 
Nobody can check the validity of signature without his cooperation.  
Many threshold signature schemes require a trusted SDC to generate the group secret keys and secret 
shares of group members, which have a single point of vulnerability. The existence of such a center is not 
a reasonable assumption; there are two potential problems.  
• First, for many applications, there is no one person or devices which cab be completely trusted 
by all members of the group. 
•  Second, the use of a key center creates a single point failure. Any security lapse at the key 
center can reveal the private key.  
To avoid these problems, in 1992, Harn introduced a scheme based on a modified ElGamal signature 
scheme, which does not require a trusted SDC [10]. Each member works as a SDC, generates and 
distributes the secret shares for each user. In this paper, we proposed a Directed - Threshold Multi - 
Signature Scheme without SDC.  
2. Directed - Threshold Multi - Signature Scheme without SDC 
In this scheme, each shareholder works as a SDC to generate his secret key and distribute the 
corresponding secret shares to other shareholders. In advance, all the shareholders are agree for the public 
parameters. We assume that there is a designated combiner DC who takes the responsibility to collect 
and verify each partial signature and then produce a group signature. Nevertheless, there is no partial 
secret information of the other users associated with the DC. 
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2.1.Group Public Key and Secret Shares Generation Phase 
(a).All the members of the organization S agree to select the group public parameters  p,  q , g ,h and a 
common random secret K.  
(b). Each member i  in GS computes  W   =  Kg − mod p. 
(c). Each member i  in GS  randomly selects a  (t – 1) th  degree polynomial f i (x) secretly and an 
integer 
iSu ∈  Zq publicly. 
(d). Each member i  in GS  computes partial group public key iy   =   g  f i (0) mod p. 
(e). The group public key Sy is given by   Sy =   ∏
∈ SGi
  iy  mod p. 
(f). Each member i in GS works as SDC.He selects a random secret hij  ∈  Zq and computes the secret 
value  lij  and public value mij , nij   for     j ≠ i, as, 
lij     =   [hij  + f i ( iSu )] mod q, 
mij       =   
ijlg
  mod p  and   nij  =  
ijhg
 mod p. 
(g). Each member i  in GS  computes a public value iSv   for each member j ≠ i,  of the group GS , as,  ijSv   
=     lij . 
K
S jy  mod p. 
   Here, 
jS
y
 is the public key associated with each user j  in the group GS. 
(h). Each member i  in  GS  sends 
ijS
v  to each member j ≠ i, through a public channel.  
2.2. Partial Signature Generation by any t  Members and Verification 
If any t members of the organization out of n members agree to sign a message m for a person R. R 
possesses a pair ( Rx  , Ry ). Then the signature generation has the following steps. 
(a). Each member  i ,i ∈ HS , randomly selects 1iK and 2iK  ∈  Zq and computes   
ui    =   g 2iK− mod p,  vi       =    g 1iK  mod p   and  wi      =    g 1iK  Ry 2i
K
 mod p. 
(b). Each member makes  ui  , wi  publicly and vi  secretly available to each member of HS . Once all ui ,vi 
and  wi are available, each member  i ,i ∈ HS computes  the product US , VS  ,WS and a hash value RS 
,as, 
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US   =   qu
SHi
i mod∏
∈
,   VS     =    qv
SHi
i mod∏
∈
, 
WS    =  qw
SHi
i mod∏
∈
,  and  RS    =    h (VS  ,m) mod q. 
(c). Each member i ,i ∈ HS  recovers his/her secret share  lji  , as,  
lji  =   jiSv
iSxW mod  p.      ( j ≠ i.) 
(d). Each member i ,i ∈ HS  computes a value  Ci    = q
uu
u
ikHk SS
S
S ki
k mod)(
)0(
,
∏
≠∈ −
−
. 
(e). Each member of HS  computes his/her modified shadow iSMS   = 
∉∈ SS HjGj
jil
,
.Ci mod q. 
(f). Each member i ,i ∈ HS  uses his/her modified shadow, iSMS and a value si , as 
si   =      [ 1iK + (  fi (0) + iSMS ).RS ] mod q. 
(g). Each member i ,i ∈ HS sends his partial signature to the designated combiner DC .  DC verify the 
partial signature ( si , vi ,Ci , RS ) by the relation,  
g is     ≡
?
    vi  .
 
S
SS
i
R
HjGj
C
jii my 





 ∏
∉∈ ,
mod p. 
If the above equation holds, then the partial signature( si , vi ,Ci , R ) for shareholder i is valid. 
2.3.Group Signature Generation. 
(a). DC can computes the group signature  SS  =  
=
t
i ,1
si mod q  by combining all the partial signature.  
(b). DC sends { SS , US ,WS  , m} as signature of the group S for the message m to R. 
2.4.Signature Verification by R 
To verify the validity of the group signature {SS , US ,WS  , m } the verifier R  needs is/her secret key 
Rx . This sub-section consists of the following steps. 
(a).The verifier R computes a verification value E    =   ∏ ∏
∈ ∉∈
















S
i
SSHi
C
HjGj
jin
,
mod p. 
(b). Only the verifier R can recovers the values RR  and RS ,as 
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RR   =   WS . R
x
SU mod p  and  RS    =    h ( VS  ,m ). 
(c). The verifier R uses the congruence g SS    ≡
?
  RR . ( E . S
R
Sy )  mod p to check the validity the 
signature. If this congruence holds, then the group signature {SS , US ,WS  , m}  is valid signature of the 
organization S on the message m. 
2.5. Proof of Validity by R  to any  third Party C 
(a). R computes  µ   = US Rx  mod p and RR      =     µ  .WS  mod p.   
(b). R sends { RR, E, SS , US , m, µ} to C. 
(c). C recovers RS    =  h (RR  , m ) and uses the following congruence to check the validity of the 
signature  
g SS                             ≡
?
                  RR  . ( E . SRSy )  mod p. 
                 If this does not hold C stops the process; otherwise goes to the next step. 
(d) In a zero knowledge fashion R proves to C that log
 
SU
 µ     =    log g Ry  as follows:-  
• C chooses random u, v ∈ Zp computes w = (US )u . g v mod p and sends w to R. 
• R chooses random  ∈ Zp computes  = w. g α mod p, γ  =  Rx  mod p and sends , γ to C. 
• C sends u, v to R, by which R can verify that w   =   (US )u . g v mod p. 
• R sends  to C, by which she can verify that            
              =     (US )u . g v +α mod p,     and       γ       =          (µ  )u  Ry  v +α  mod p. 
3. Security Discussions 
In this sub-section, we shall discuss the security aspects of proposed scheme. Here we shall discuss 
several possible attacks and show that, none of these can successfully break the system. 
(a). Is it possible to retrieve the partial secret keys fi(0) , i ∈ GS    ? 
This is as difficult as solving discrete logarithm problem. No one can get the partial group public key 
iy , since fi  is the randomly and secretly selected polynomial by the member i.  On the other hand, by 
using the public keys Sy  no one also get the partial secret keys fi(0) because  
iy   =   g 
 f 
i 
(0)
 mod p  and  Sy =   ∏
∈ SGi
iy  mod p. 
(b). Is it possible to retrieve the secret share lij   from the equation 
lij   = [hij  + f i ( iSu )] mod q ? 
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No, because fi  is the randomly and secretly selected polynomial and hij is also a randomly and 
secretly selected integer by the member i. 
(c). Is it possible to retrieve the secret share lij   from the equation 
                                                  mij   = 
ijlg   mod p  ? 
No, because this is as difficult as solving discrete logarithm problem. 
(d). Is it possible to retrieve the secret share lij   from the equation  
ijSv =    lij . 
K
S jy  mod p? 
No because K is a randomly and secretly selected common integer. 
(e). Is it possible to retrieve the secret shares lij from the equation 
lji   =   jiSv
iSxW mod  p? 
Only the user i can recovers his secret shares lij because iSx  is secret key of the user i.  
(f). Can one retrieve the modified shadow
iSMS from the equation 
iSMS   =  
∉∈ SS HjGj
jil
,
.Ci mod q   ? 
It is impossible to collect the modified shadow
iSMS from the equation because all lij are secret 
information shared by the users. 
(g). Is it possible that the designated combiner DC retrieve the any partial information from the equation    
SS   =    
∈ SHi
si mod q   ? 
Obviously, this is computationally infeasible for DC. 
(h). Is it possible to that any one can impersonate a user i ∈ H  ? 
A forger may try to impersonate a user i ∈ HS ,  by randomly selecting  two integers 1iK and 2iK ∈ Zq 
and broadcasting ui , vi   and  wi.. But without knowing the secret shares lij and RS ,  it is difficult to 
generate a valid partial signature si to satisfy the verification equations,   
g is     ≡
?
   vi  .
 
S
SS
i
R
HJGj
C
jii my 





 ∏
∉∈ ,
mod p. 
(g). Is it possible to that any one can forge a signature {SS ,US ,WS ,m} by the following equation   
g SS    ≡
?
   RR  . ( E . SRSy )  mod p ? 
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A forger may randomly selects an integer RR and then computes the hash value RS such that   RS   =    h 
(RR  , m) mod q, obviously to compute the integer SS  is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm 
problem. On the other hand, the forger can randomly select RS and SS  first, then try to determine a 
value RR that satisfies the signature verification equation. However, according to the property of the 
hash function h, it is quite impossible. Thus, this attack will not be successful. 
4. Illustration 
For illustration, Suppose =SG 7, =SH 4, p = 47, q = 23, g = 3, K  = 11and W = 12. 
Group public Key and Secret Shares Generation Phase 
(a). All the users compute their secret and public values, which are given by the following table. 
VALUE 
USER 
Secret 
f i (x) 
Secret 
fi (0) 
Public 
u
                
Public 
iy  
Secret 
iSx  
Public 
iSy
 
User-S1 7 + 12 x3 7 9 25 9 37 
User-S2 9 + 11 x3 9 13 37 11 4 
User-S3 14 + 8 x3 14 15 14 13     36 
User-S4 17 + 3 x3 17 11 2 19 18 
User-S5 13 + 7 x3 13 18 36 5 8 
User-S6 18 + 15x3 18 19 6 10 17 
User-S7 21 + 15 x3 21 21 21 14 14 
(b).  The group public key Sy is given by  Sy   =   25. 
(c).  User- S1  makes the following table. 
 
          VALUE 
USER 
  secret                                                   
h1j      
secret  
l1j      
public        
m1j 
 public         
n1j 
public    
   v1j 
User – S2 14 4 34 14 2 
User – S3 9 13 36       37 10 
User – S4 11 5 8 4 45 
User – S5 15 17 2 42 18 
User – S6 17 15 42 2 43 
User – S7 13 16 32 36 42 
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(d). User- S2 makes the following table. 
 
         VALUE 
USER 
  Secret                                                  
h2j      
Secret
l2j      
 Public                
m2j 
Public         
n2j 
Public    
   v2j 
User – S1    13     14     14     36    21 
User – S3    14      3     27     14    24 
User – S4      9      8     28     17    25 
User – S5     7     21     21     25    25 
User – S6    16     11      4       8    19 
User – S7     3     16     32     27    42 
 
(e).User- S3 and makes the following table. 
 
         VALUE 
USER 
  Secret                                                   
h3j      
Secret
l3j      
 Public                
m3j 
Public         
n3j 
Public    
   v3j 
User – S1       7     11      4     25    40 
User – S2     10      5      8     17    26 
User – S4     11      1      3      4      9 
User – S5     13    16     32     36    28 
User – S6     19     4     34     18    24 
User – S7     21    17       2     21    27 
 
(f).User- S4 makes the following table. 
             VALUE 
USER 
  Secret                                                   
h4j      
Secret
l4j      
 Public                
m4j 
Public         
n4j 
Public    
   v4j 
User – S1     19      15      14     18    46 
User – S2     13      20      7     36    10 
User – S3     11      10     17      4    33 
User – S5      6      16     32     24    28 
User – S6      8      17      2     28      8 
User – S7     18      11      4       6    23 
 
 
 9 
(g).User- S5 makes the following table. 
 
         VALUE 
USER 
  Secret                                                   
h5j      
Secret
l5j      
 Public                
m5j 
Public         
n5j 
Public    
   v5j 
User – S1      6     16      32     24    24 
User – S2     17     22      16       2    11 
User – S3     18     15      42       6    26 
User – S4     13      5        8      36    45 
User – S6     19     21      21     18    32 
User – S7      8     11        4     28    23 
 
(h).User- S6 makes the following table 
 
          VALUE 
USER 
  Secret                                                 
h6j      
Secret       
l6j      
 Public                
m6j 
Public         
n6j 
Public    
   v6j 
User – S1     2       7      25       9    34 
User – S2      5     19      18       8    33 
User – S3     7       4      34      25    32 
User – S4    11       7      25        4    16 
User – S5    13     19      18      36    45 
User – S7    12       2        9      12    17 
 
(i).User- S7 makes the following table. 
 
         VALUE 
USER 
  Secret                                             
h7j      
Secret       
l7j      
 Public                
m7j 
Public         
n7j 
Public    
   v7j 
User – S1     11     19     18      4      5 
User – S2     13       7     25    36    27 
User – S3     15     15    42    42    26 
User – S4     17    16    32      2      3 
User – S5     14     8    28    16    14 
User – S6     12    16    32    12      2 
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Partial Signature Generation by any t Users  
  If any four members S2 ,S4,S6, and S7 are agree to sign a message m for a person R, possessing Rx  = 
7, Ry  =   25 ,then the signature generation has the following steps.  
(a). S2 randomly selects 12K = 11, 22K =  13 and computes u2  =  1,v2  =  4 and  w2  = 17. 
(b). S4 randomly selects 14K =  10, 24K = 12 and computes u4  = 4, v4  = 17 and w4  =  9.  
(c). S
 6 randomly selects 16K = 14, 26K = 17 and computes u6  =  24,v6   = 14  and w6  = 6. 
(d). S7 randomly selects 17K = 18, 27K =  5 and computes u7   =  6, v7   =  6 and w7   =  25. 
(e). Each user computes US  =  16, RR  =   25,WS  =  14 and RS   = h (25, m )  =  7. (let). 
(f). S2, recovers his shares l12   =   4,l32   =   5, l52   =  22 and  C2  = 1,MS2 = 8,  s2  =  15. 
(g). S4 recovers his shares l14 =  5,l34    = 1,l54 =   5 and C4 =11, MS4  =  6, s4   =  10. 
(h). S6 recovers his shares l16  = 15,l36   =  4,l56  = 21and C6  = 9,MS6  =15, s6   =  15. 
(i). S7 recovers his shares l17 = 16,l37  = 17,l57  = 11and C7  =   3,MS7  = 17, s7   = 8. 
Partial Signature Verification and Signature Generation by DC 
(a) DC verifies each partial signature. For example for user S2 ,  s2  = 15, v2  = 4, m12  = 34, m32   =  8, m52    
=  16,
2Sy  = 37, RS   =  7, C2  =  12, and  check   3
 16     ≡
?
    4
  
.37 7   (34. 8. 16 ) 7mod 47. This holds. 
Similarly, he checks other partial signatures.                   
(b). DC computes a group value SS  =  2 and sends { 2 , 16 ,14  , m } as signature of the group S for the 
message m. 
Signature Verification by the Person R  
(a). The verifier R computes a verification value E   =  12. 
(b). The verifier R can recovers the values RR   =   25 and RS   =  7. 
(c). The verifier R uses the congruence3 2 ≡
?
 25
 
. ( 12.25) 7 
 
mod47 to check the validity of the signature.   
This congruence holds, so the group signature {2 ,16
 
,14
 
,m}  is valid signature of the group S on the 
message m  for the person R.  
Proof of Validity by R to any third Party C 
(a). R computes  µ  =  32, RR  =  25 and sends {25,12,2,16,m,32} to C. 
(b). C recovers RS    =  7 and check the concurrence 3 2   ≡
?
  25
 
. (12.25) 7 
 
mod47 for the validity of the 
signature. This holds; so, C goes to the next steps. 
(c). R in a zero knowledge fashion proves to C that log
 16 32    =    log 3 25 as follows:-  
• C chooses random u = 13, v = 15 and computes w =  9 and sends w to R. 
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• R chooses random  = 11 computes  = 36, γ  = 16 and sends , γ to C. 
• C sends u, v to R, by which R can verify that w   =   9. 
• R sends  to C, by which she can verify that   = 36 and  γ  = 16. 
5. Remarks 
In this paper, we have proposed a Directed –Threshold Multi - signature Scheme without SDC. In this 
scheme, 
• Each shareholder works as a SDC to generate his secret key and distribute the 
corresponding secret shares to other shareholders. 
•  There is a designated combiner DC who takes the responsibility to collect and verify each 
partial signature and then produce a group signature, but no secret information is 
associated with the DC. 
• Any malicious set of signers cannot impersonate any other set of signers to forge the 
signatures. In case of forgery, it is possible to trace the signing set. 
• Any t or more shareholders acting in collusion cannot conspire to reconstruct the group 
secret key by providing their own secret shares. 
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